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Abstract
Clustering algorithms play a fundamental role as tools in
decision-making and sensible automation processes. Due to
the widespread use of these applications, a robustness analy-
sis of this family of algorithms against adversarial noise has
become imperative. To the best of our knowledge, however,
only a few works have currently addressed this problem. In an
attempt to fill this gap, in this work, we propose a black-box
adversarial attack for crafting adversarial samples to test the
robustness of clustering algorithms. We formulate the problem
as a constrained minimization program, general in its structure
and customizable by the attacker according to her capability
constraints. We do not assume any information about the inter-
nal structure of the victim clustering algorithm, and we allow
the attacker to query it as a service only. In the absence of any
derivative information, we perform the optimization with a
custom approach inspired by the Abstract Genetic Algorithm
(AGA). In the experimental part, we demonstrate the sensi-
bility of different single and ensemble clustering algorithms
against our crafted adversarial samples on different scenarios.
Furthermore, we perform a comparison of our algorithm with
a state-of-the-art approach showing that we are able to reach
or even outperform its performance. Finally, to highlight the
general nature of the generated noise, we show that our attacks
are transferable even against supervised algorithms such as
SVMs, random forests and neural networks.
1 Introduction
The state of the art in machine learning and computer vision
has greatly improved over the course of the last decade, to the
point that many algorithms are commonly used as effective
aiding tools in security (spam/malware detection [Mallikar-
junappa and Prabhakar 2010], face recognition [Tapaswi,
Law, and Fidler 2019]) or decision making (road-sign de-
tection [Wali et al. 2015], cancer detection [Kourou et al.
2014], financial sentiment analysis [Sohangir et al. 2018])
related tasks. The increasing pervasiveness of these applica-
tions in our everyday life poses an issue about the robustness
of the employed algorithms against sophisticated forms of
non-random noise.
Adversarial learning has emerged over the past few years
as a line of research focused on studying and addressing the
aforementioned robustness issue. Perhaps, the most important
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result in this field is the discovery of adversarial noise, a
wisely crafted form of noise that, if applied to an input, does
not affect human judgment but can significantly decrease the
performance of the learning models [Szegedy et al. 2014; Jia
and Liang 2017]. Adversarial noise has been applied with
success to fool models used in security scenarios such as
spam filtering [Lowd and Meek 2005; Biggio et al. 2011;
Attar, Rad, and Atani 2013] or malware detection [Biggio
et al. 2013], but also in broader scenarios such as image
classification [Eykholt et al. 2018].
The vast majority of the works done so far in this field
deals with supervised learning. However, its unsupervised
counterpart is equally present in sensible applications, such
as fraud detection, image segmentation, and market analysis,
not to mention the plethora of security-based applications for
detecting dangerous or illicit activities [Perdisci, Corona, and
Giacinto 2012; Crussell, Gibler, and Chen 2013; Wang et al.
2014; Pai et al. 2017; Chakraborty, Pierazzi, and Subrahma-
nian 2017].
It follows that the robustness of unsupervised algorithms
used by those applications is crucial to give credibility to the
results provided. Among the unsupervised tasks, in this work,
we focus our attention on instance clustering with feature and
image data.
The majority of clustering algorithms are not differentiable,
thus adversarial gradient-based approaches – widely used in
supervised settings – are not directly applicable. Since, in
general, the machine learning field is currently dominated
by gradient-based methods, this may represent a possible
reason for the limited interest in this field. Nonetheless, the
problem has been addressed in a complete white-box setting
in [Dutrisac and Skillicorn 2008; Biggio et al. 2013; Crus-
sell and Kegelmeyer 2015], where some gradient-free attack
algorithms have been proposed. In these works, the authors
usually leverage the internal behavior of the clustering meth-
ods under study to craft ad-hoc adversarial noise. To the best
of our knowledge, little work has been done against black-box
algorithms. The design of black-box adversarial attacks, not
only can help in finding common weaknesses of clustering
algorithms but can also pave the road toward general rules
for the formulation of robust clustering algorithms. In this
work, we propose an algorithm to craft adversarial examples
in a gradient-free fashion, without knowing the identity of
the target clustering method. We assume that the attacker can
only perform queries to it. Furthermore, we argue that, due
to its general nature, the noise generated by our adversarial
algorithm can also be applied to fool effectively supervised
methods.
The main contributions of our work are as follows: (a) We
design a new black-box gradient-free optimization algorithm
to fool data clustering algorithms, and provide convergence
guarantees. (b) We propose a new objective function that
takes into consideration the attacker’s capability constraints,
motivating its suitability in this setting. (c) We perform exper-
iments on three different datasets against different clustering
methods, showing that our algorithm can significantly af-
fect the clustering performance. (d) Following the work of
[Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016], we perform a
transferability analysis, showing that our crafted adversarial
samples are suitable to fool supervised algorithms.
2 Related Work
Several works use clustering for extracting data patterns in a
given dataset. For instance, the work of [Rieck et al. 2011]
proposed Malheur, a tool for behavioral malware detection
that combines clustering and classification for detecting novel
malware categories. [Crussell, Gibler, and Chen 2013] have
proposed AnDarwin, a software for detecting plagiarism in
Android applications. In this approach, clustering is used to
handle large numbers of applications, unlike previous meth-
ods that compare apps pairwise. More recently, [Hammer-
schmidt et al. 2016] have presented a tool for anomaly detec-
tion in networking by using a clustering algorithm. Despite
the greater need to have robust clustering algorithms, only a
few works address their security problems.
The first works on the analysis of adversarial manip-
ulations against clustering algorithms were proposed in
[Dutrisac and Skillicorn 2008] and [Skillicorn 2009]. The
authors observed that some samples could be misclustered
by positioning them close to the original cluster boundary, so
that a new fringe cluster is formed.
[Biggio et al. 2013] provided a theoretical formulation for
the adversarial clustering problem and proposed a perfect-
knowledge attack to fool single-linkage hierarchical clus-
tering. In particular, the authors defined two different attack
strategies: poisoning and obfuscation. The former infects data
to violate the system availability and deteriorate the clustering
results. The latter taints a target set of samples to violate the
system integrity. In our threat model, we share the same aims
of the poisoning strategy; however, differently from what has
been done in [Biggio et al. 2013], we extend the application
of poisoning by allowing the attacker to manipulate already
existing samples in the dataset instead of injecting new ones.
Later on, in [Biggio et al. 2014], the previous work was ex-
tended by proposing a threat model against complete-linkage
hierarchical clustering. [Crussell and Kegelmeyer 2015] de-
fined a threat algorithm to fool DBSCAN-based algorithms
by selecting and then merging arbitrary clusters.
All the aforementioned works assume that the attacker
has perfect knowledge about the clustering algorithm under
attack. In our work, we overcome this assumption by propos-
ing a gradient-free algorithm to fool clustering algorithms
in a generalized black-box setting, meaning that the attacker
has no prior knowledge about the clustering algorithm and
its parameters. We design our algorithm as an instance of
an Abstract Genetic Algorithm [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee
1990], in which the adversarial noise improves generation by
generation.
Recently, a similar problem has been addressed in
[Chhabra, Roy, and Mohapatra 2019], where it has been
proposed a derivative-free, black-box attack strategy to tar-
get clustering algorithms working on linearly separable tasks.
The approach consists of manipulating only one specific input
sample feature-by-feature to corrupt the clustering decision
boundary. However, our method is still different, since:
• It has been designed for attacking generic clustering algo-
rithms (not only linearly separable ones).
• We propose a way to address multi-clustering problems by
allowing the attacker to manipulate samples coming from
different clusters.
• We prove that our algorithm has significant convergence
properties to find the optimal perturbation for multiple
samples and features at the same time.
• We penalize our solutions by considering the number of
manipulated features in addition to the maximum accept-
able noise threshold.
3 Methodology
Let X ∈ Rn×d denote a feature matrix representing the
dataset to be poisoned, where n is the number of samples
and d is the number of features. We define C : Rn×d →
{1, . . . ,K}n to be the target clustering algorithm, that sepa-
rates n samples into K different classes (1 ≤ K ≤ n). We
remark that by querying the clustering algorithm, the attacker
can retrieve the number of clusters, and they may also change
during the evaluation.
We consider the problem of crafting an adversarial mask
, to be injected into X, such that the clustering partitions
C(X) and C(X+ ) are different to a certain degree. In real
scenarios, the attacker may follow some policies on the na-
ture of the attack, usually imposed by intrinsic constraints on
the problem at hand [Biggio and Roli 2018]. We model the
scenario in which the attacker may want to perturb a specific
subset of samples T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, in such a way that the
attack is not human-detectable. i.e. by constraining the norm
of  [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2018; Su, Var-
gas, and Sakurai 2019]. In our work, the attacker’s capability
constraints [Biggio and Roli 2018] are thus defined by (a) an
attacker’s maximum power δ, which is the maximum amount
of noise allowed to be injected in a single entry xij , (b) an
attacker’s maximum effort γ, which is the maximum number
of manipulable entries of X. Further, we assume the attacker
has access to the feature matrix X, and she can query the
clustering algorithm C under attack.
Given these considerations, an optimization program for
our task is proposed as follows:
min
 ∈ ET,δ
φ(C(X), C(X+ )) (1)
where φ is a similarity measure between clusterings, and
ET,δ = {v ∈ Rn×d, ‖v‖∞ < δ ∧ vi = 0 ∀i /∈ T} (2)
is the adversarial attack space, which defines the space of all
possible adversarial masks that satisfy the maximum power
constraints and perturb only the samples in T . A problem
without such capability constraints can be denoted with EX,∞.
Note that γ is not directly referenced in ET,δ but is bounded
by T itself, namely γ = |T | · d.
We further elaborate Program 1 by searching for low Power
& Effort (P&E) noise masks, in order to enforce the non-
detectability of the attack. To this end, we adopt a similar
strategy as in [Liu et al. 2017], which adds a penalty term
λ‖‖p to the cost function, usually with p = 0, 2 or∞. Fol-
lowing this approach, we reformulate Program 1 by including
a penalty term that takes into consideration both the attacker’s
P&E which leverages respectively the∞ and 0 norms. The
optimization program becomes:
min
 ∈ ET,δ
φ(C(X), C(X+ )) + λ‖‖0‖‖∞ (3)
This choice keeps the optimization program interpretable
since it establishes a straightforward connection to our mini-
mization desiderata (low P&E). In addition, our penalty term
can be seen as a proxy function for ‖‖p, granting similar
regularization properties to the optimization. Indeed the P&E
penalty is an upper bound to the single norm term, as the
following lemma shows:
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ Rn, and p, q ∈ R ∪ {+∞} such that
1 ≤ p ≤ q < +∞ then:
‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖0‖x‖q (4)
Proof. The case x = 0 is trivial. Suppose that ∀i, xi 6=
0, then for a known result on the equivalence of norms
in Rn [Horn and Johnson 2012] we know that ‖x‖p ≤
n(1/p−1/q)‖x‖q , thus:
‖x‖p ≤ n(1/p−1/q)‖x‖q ≤ n1/p‖x‖q ≤ n‖x‖q
= ‖x‖0‖x‖q (5)
Suppose now, without loss of generality that x =
(x1, . . . , xm, 0, . . . , 0)
>, such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, xi 6= 0
. Consider its projection x′ onto the axes 1, . . . ,m, then
∀p ≥ 0, ‖x‖p = ‖x′‖p. Thus Equation 5 holds since:
‖x‖p = ‖x′‖p ≤ m‖x′‖q = ‖x‖0‖x‖q
3.1 Threat Algorithm
The approach we used to optimize Program (3), takes its
inspiration from Genetic Algorithms (GA) [Goldberg 1989].
These methods nicely fit our black-box setting since they
do not require any particular property on the function to
be optimized. Furthermore, our algorithm possesses solid
convergence properties. In the supplementary material, we
show that our algorithm is an instance of the Abstract Genetic
Algorithm (AGA), as presented in [Eiben, Aarts, and Van Hee
1991; Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990], and we give a proof
of its convergence.
An additional constraint, usually imposed in real-world
scenarios, is represented by the limited number of queries
that can be performed to the algorithm under attack [Alzantot
et al. 2019]. Classical approaches in GAs usually create large,
fixed-size populations at each generation, and this, in turn,
requires to compute the fitness score multiple times, querying
C for each individual in the population, thereby making the
process query-inefficient. To address this issue, we propose a
growing size population approach. We start with a population
Θ of size equal to 1 and, generation by generation, we grow it
by producing a new individual. To still harness the explorative
power of GAs, we use higher mutation rates on average, and
we allow the population set Θ to grow by keeping trace of all
the previously computed individuals. Further decisions can
be adopted to prevent Θ to grow too much in size. However,
in our experiments, we adopt a technique to speed up the
convergence of the optimization algorithm by reducing the
number of generations (c.f. Section 3.2).
Algorithm 1 Black-box poisoning
1: Input: X ∈ Rn×d, C, δ, T,G, l
2: Output: optimal adversarial mask ∗
3:
4: Initialize (0) ∈ ET,δ randomly
5: Θ = {(0)}
6:
7: for g = 0 to G− 1 do
8: 
(g+1)
ch = choice(Θ, l)
9: 
(g+1)
cr = crossover((g), 
(g+1)
ch )
10: (g+1) = mutation((g+1)cr , δ, T )
11: Θ = Θ ∪ {(g+1)}
12: end for
13: return: ∗ = arg min∈Θ l()
Algorithm 1 describes our optimization approach. It takes
as input the feature matrix X, the clustering algorithm C, the
target samples T , the maximum attacker’s power δ, the total
number of generations G (the attacker’s budget in term of
queries) and the attacker’s objective function l (which in our
case is the one defined in Program (3)). The resulting output
is the optimal adversarial noise mask ∗ that minimizes l.
At each generation, a new adversarial mask (g+1) is gener-
ated and added to a population set Θ containing all previous
masks.
The core parts of our optimization process are the stochas-
tic operators – choice, crossover and mutation –
that we use for crafting new candidate solutions with a better
fitness score. In the following, we describe their implementa-
tion.
Choice The choice operator is used to decide which can-
didates will be chosen to generate offspring. We adopt a
roulette wheel approach [Goldberg 1989], where only one
candidate is selected with a probability proportional to its
fitness score, which in turn is inversely proportional to the
attacker’s objective function l. Given a candidate (i), its
probability to be chosen for the production process p((i)) is
equal to:
p((i)) =
exp(−l((i)))∑
∈Θ exp(−l())
(6)
We remark that our choice operator picks just one adversarial
noise mask that is then used in the crossover step.
Crossover The crossover operator simulates the repro-
duction phase, by combining different candidate solutions
(parents) for generating new ones (offspring). Commonly,
crossover operators work with binary-valued strings, how-
ever, since our candidates are matrices in ET,δ, we propose
a variant. Given two candidates ′, ′′ ∈ ET,δ, the new off-
spring is generated starting from ′, then with probability
equal to pc each entry i, j is swapped with the entry i, j in ′′.
The crossover operator has probability pc of being applied;
in the case of failure, ′ itself is chosen as an offspring.
Mutation The mutation is a fundamental operator, usually
applied to the offspring generated by the crossover, to intro-
duce genetic variation in the current population. Our operator
mutates each entry ij s.t. i ∈ T with probability pm by
adding an uniformly distributed random noise in the range
[−δ, δ]. The resulting perturbation matrix, is subsequently
clipped to preserve the constraints dictated by ET,δ .
Moreover, to enforce the low attacker’s effort desiderata,
we also perform zero-mutation, meaning that each entry of
the mask is set to zero with probability pz .
3.2 Speeding up the convergence
By just generating a new individual at each generation, our
proposed method has the major drawback of being slow at
converging. To counter this problem, inspired by the work
of [Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015], we decided to
“imprint” a direction to the generated adversary mask to move
the adversarial samples towards the target cluster. Since we
lack the gradient information, the centroids information is
leveraged instead. We propose the following approach: each
adversarial mask  ∈ ET,δ is generated with the additional
constraint that ∀i, j ij ≥ 0. After this, the mask is multi-
plied by a direction matrixψ with ψij = sgn(c
(t)
j −c(v)j ), c(t)
and c(v) being respectively the target and victim cluster cen-
troids. This variant can be easily implemented by changing
the initialization of (0) and the mutation step only. It follows
that the resulting adversarial attack space is now reduced to
E ′T,δ ⊂ ET,δ . We still grant that the capability constraints are
respected and the convergence properties hold, although the
quality of the found optimum may be inferior.
4 Experimental results
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the
proposed methodology of attack.
4.1 Robustness analysis
We ran the experiments on three real-world datasets: Fash-
ionMNIST [Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017], CIFAR-10
[Krizhevsky 2009] and 20 Newsgroups [Lang 1995]. We
focused our analysis on both two- and multiple-way cluster-
ing problems. For FashionMNIST and 20 Newsgroups, we
simulated the former scenario in which an attacker wants to
perturb samples of one victim cluster Cv towards a target
cluster Ct. For CIFAR-10, we allowed the attacker to move
samples from multiple victim clusters towards a target one by
simply running multiple times our algorithm with a different
victim cluster for each run. In the experiments, we chose T
to contain the s|Cv| nearest neighbors belonging to the cur-
rently chosen victim cluster, with respect to the centroid of
the target cluster. In particular, for FashionMNIST we used
20 different values for s and δ, in the intervals [0.01, 0.6] and
[0.05, 1] respectively; for CIFAR-10 we used 20 different
values for s and δ, in the intervals [0.01, 0.6] and [0.01, 1.5]
respectively; for 20 Newsgroups we used 15 different val-
ues for s and δ, in the intervals [0.01, 0.3] and [0.001, 0.3]
respectively.
We tested the robustness of three standard clustering algo-
rithms: hierarchical clustering using Ward’s criterion [Ward Jr
1963], K-Means++ [Arthur and Vassilvitskii 2007] and the
normalized spectral clustering [Shi and Malik 2000] as pre-
sented in [von Luxburg 2007], with the [Zelnik-Manor and
Perona 2004] similarity measure. The code has been written
in PyTorch [Paszke et al. 2019], and it is available as part of
the supplementary material.
For the optimization program, we set λ = 1α·n·d with
α = 255 as penalty term for our cost function. In addition, in
the optimization algorithm, we set the probability of having
crossover pc = 0.85, mutation pm = 0.05 and zero-mutation
pz = 0.001. The total number of generations, which corre-
spond to the number of queries, was always set to 110, using
the heuristic proposed in Section 3.2. In addition, we repeated
these experiments for five times, reporting the mean with the
standard error.
In Program (3), we indicate with φ a function for measur-
ing the similarity between two clustering partitions. In the lit-
erature, we can find several metrics used for the evaluation of
clusterings [Hubert and Arabie 1985; Strehl and Ghosh 2002;
Meila 2005; Nguyen, Epps, and Bailey 2009]; in addition,
[Biggio et al. 2013] proposed to adopt the following measure
for the evaluation: d(Y,Y′) = ‖YY> −Y′Y′>‖F , where
‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm, and Y,Y′ ∈ Rn×k are one-hot
encodings of the clusterings C(X) and C(X+) respectively.
In our work, we decided to use the Adjusted Mutual Infor-
mation (AMI) Score, proposed in [Nguyen, Epps, and Bailey
2009] since it makes no assumptions about the cluster struc-
ture and, as highlighted in [Romano et al. 2016], it works
well even in the presence of unbalanced clusters. Indeed, the
clustering partition over the poisoned dataset might also cre-
ate unbalanced clusters, especially if the attacker wants to
move samples only from one towards the others. The reader
can refer to the supplementary material where a comparison
analysis between different similarity functions is offered.
FashionMNIST The FashionMNIST contains 70 000
grayscale images of size 28 × 28 pixels [Xiao, Rasul, and
Vollgraf 2017]. In our experiments we randomly sampled
800 images for class Ankle boot (victim cluster) and 800
Figure 1: Robustness analysis with FashionMNIST (left), CIFAR-10 (middle), 20 Newsgroups (right). The plots depict the decay
of AMI by adversarially perturbing the datasets, with an increasing noise.
for class Shirt (target cluster). In Figure 1 (left), we report
the obtained results. We observe that the three algorithms
have similar behavior and their clustering accuracy consis-
tently decreases with the increment of the adversarial noise
level. In this case, K-Means++ shows better performance
than spectral clustering, therefore the spectral embedding of
data samples seems less robust than raw features only. This
fact may suggest that some embedding procedures devised
for improving clustering accuracy do not necessarily guar-
antee robustness against adversarial attacks. However, we
reserve further discussion on this in future work.
CIFAR-10 The CIFAR-10 contains 60 000 colour images
of size 32× 32 pixels [Krizhevsky 2009]. We randomly sam-
pled 1 600 images from classes deer, frog and truck.
We addressed the multi-way scenario by first moving sam-
ples from frog and then from deer, always towards the
target cluster truck. Moreover, we used a ResNet50 for
features extraction, and we performed clustering on the re-
sulting feature space, obtaining better initial results in terms
of AMI. In Figure 1 (middle), we show the performance
of the three clustering algorithms under adversarial manip-
ulations. We observe that our attacks significantly decrease
the clustering quality for the three algorithms. Even if the
ResNet50 features allow cluster algorithms to achieve better
performance, they are still vulnerable to adversarial noise.
Further, note how the gap in performance of spectral clus-
tering and K-Means++ has even increased when adopting a
DNN-generated embedding.
20 Newsgroups The 20 Newsgroups is a dataset commonly
used for text classification and clustering, which contains
20 000 newspaper articles divided into 20 categories. The
experiments were conducted with two highly unrelated cat-
egories of news, rec.sport.baseball (victim cluster)
and talk.politics.guns (target cluster). We applied
the a combination of TF-IDF [Salton and Buckley 1988] and
LSA [Landauer, Foltz, and Laham 1998] to embed features
into a lower dimensional space. The resulting feature matrix
had dimension 1 400× 80. In this case, we tested our method
against two ensemble clustering algorithms, derived from K-
Means and spectral clustering algorithms (hierarchical clus-
tering was not giving good enough clustering performance).
The two algorithms use the Silhouette value [Rousseeuw
1987], and the clustering with the maximum silhouette score
is selected as the best one. In particular, we ran 20 instances
of the K-Means algorithm with random centroids initializa-
tions, while, for spectral clustering, we ran 3 instances of
the algorithm proposed in [von Luxburg 2007] with 3 differ-
ent similarity measures. Given a sample pair xi and xj , the
measures are:
sij =
x>i xj
‖xi‖2‖xj‖2 (7)
sij =
(xi − x¯)>(xj − x¯)
‖xi − x¯‖2‖xj − x¯‖2 (8)
sij = dmax − ‖xi − xj‖2 (9)
Equation 7 represents the cosine similarity between two
samples xi and xj . Equation 8 is the Pearson correlation
coefficient, with x¯ being the sample mean. Moreover, we
introduced a sparsification technique, clamping to 0 all
negative values, which improved the clustering performance.
Finally, in Equation 9 we define dmax = maxij ‖xi − xj‖2.
Figure 1 (right) reports the performance of two clustering
algorithms under adversarial manipulation. Ensemble meth-
ods are known to be more robust against random noise with
respect to the normal behavior of the corresponding algo-
rithms [Opitz and Maclin 1999; Nguyen and Caruana 2007];
however, our attacking model was able to fool them and sig-
nificantly decreased their clustering performance. In this case,
in low noise regime, spectral clustering seems to benefit the
ensembling technique, however its behavior follows previous
experiments.
4.2 Comparison
To the best of our knowledge, the only work dealing with
adversarial clustering in a black-box way is [Chhabra, Roy,
and Mohapatra 2019]. In this work, the authors presented a
new type of attack called spill-over, in which the attacker
wants to assign as many samples as possible to a wrong
cluster by poisoning just one of them. They proposed a threat
model against linearly separable clusters to generate such
kind of adversarial noise.
Figure 2: Spill-over samples for MNIST. (left column) target
sample. (middle column) adversarial sample with [Chhabra,
Roy, and Mohapatra 2019]. (right column) Our adversarial
sample.
Figure 3: Spill-over samples for Digits. (left column) target
sample. (middle column) adversarial sample with [Chhabra,
Roy, and Mohapatra 2019]. (right column) Our adversarial
sample.
To have a fair comparison, we performed spill-over attacks
on the same settings of the aforementioned work, comparing
the performance on MNIST and UCI Handwritten Digits
datasets1 [Alpaydin and Kaynak 1995], targeting Ward’s hi-
erarchical clustering algorithm. Further details can be found
in the supplementary material.
For MNIST, we considered the digit pairs 4&1 and 3&2,
while for Digits, we considered the digit pairs 4&1, and
8&9. Our algorithm was run with the δ = ∆ which is the
maximum acceptable noise threshold found by the authors,
with δ = ∆/2 and with δ = ∞. We imposed to attack just
one sample (|T | = 1), namely the nearest neighbor to the
centroid of the target cluster. We performed our experiments
20 times, reporting mean and std values.
The results are presented in Table 1-2 along with more
details on the experiments. Although our algorithm achieves
its best performance by moving more samples at once, we
were able to match, or even exceed, the number of spill-over
samples (#Miss-clust) achieved in [Chhabra, Roy, and
Mohapatra 2019], even when halving the attacker’s maximum
power proposed by the authors. Moreover, the results show
also that we were able to craft adversarial noise masks ,
which were significantly less detectable in terms of `0, `∞.
In Figure 3, we show a qualitative assessment of the crafted
adversarial spill-over samples. Note that the crafted adver-
sarial examples of [Chhabra, Roy, and Mohapatra 2019] do
not preserve box-constraints commonly adopted for image
data. Indeed, pixel intensities exceed 255 and 16 for MNIST
and Digits, respectively. We also evaluated the performance
of [Chhabra, Roy, and Mohapatra 2019] by clamping the
resulting adversarial examples (Spill-overclamp), and
we observe that the number of spill-over samples is reduced.
The reader can find further experiments of comparison in the
1A dataset containing 5 620 grayscale images of size 8×8, with intensities in the
range [0, 16]
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 413 872.8 146.8 2
SPILL-OVERclamp 412 828.2 146.8 2
OURS (δ = 73.43) 138± 14.4 523.6± 32.4 73.4± 1.4 12.0± 0.0
OURS (δ = 146.87) 33± 14.3 497.9± 92.5 146.0± 1.4 12.2± 1.0
OURS (δ =∞) 24± 10.7 696.2± 204.1 243.4± 13.6 13.7± 2.2
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 152 585.3 159.7 11
SPILL-OVERclamp 151 463.2 131.7 9
OURS (δ = 79.86) 117± 7.8 528.4± 30.1 79.8± 2.8 9.1± 0.4
OURS (δ = 159.72) 75± 22.4 782.7± 124.2 159.3± 1.3 12.0± 4.5
OURS (δ =∞) 46± 19.4 902.7± 205 248.3± 8.8 14.6± 4.5
Table 1: Comparison on MNIST with digits 3&2 (top) and
digits 4&1 (bottom).
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 54 15.70 9.44 21
SPILL-OVERclamp 54 15.70 9.44 21
OURS (δ = 4.72) 12± 1.20 11.49± 1.25 4.7± 0 21± 0.0
OURS (δ = 9.44) 7± 2.85 13.86± 2.96 8.12± 1.24 21± 0.0
OURS (δ =∞) 4± 1.74 15.18± 3.16 10.94± 1.49 21± 0.0
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 14 23.93 11.89 24
SPILL-OVERclamp 11 16.28 9.93 21
OURS (δ = 5.94) 13± 1.70 16.27± 1.20 5.94± 0.0 24± 0.0
OURS (δ = 11.89) 7± 2.03 19.84± 1.96 11.13± 0.79 24± 0.0
OURS (δ =∞) 7± 2.36 21.06± 2.36 12.79± 4.34 24± 0.0
Table 2: Comparison on Digits with digits 8&9 (top) and 4&1
(bottom).
supplementary material.
4.3 Empirical convergence
In addition to the theoretical results on convergence provided
in the supplementary material, in this section, we propose an
empirical analysis of convergence. In particular, for a pre-set
configuration of δ and s, we performed a series of attacks
on the FashionMNIST dataset, with an increasing number of
generations/queries, evaluating the trend of objective func-
tion presented Program (3). The results are reported in Figure
4. It can be seen that our algorithm requires a relatively low
number of queries to converge to a minimum, with the ex-
ception of K-Means++ that presents a slower convergence
than spectral clustering, most probably due to the nature of
the feature embeddings used.
4.4 Transferability
In [Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016], the authors
defined the concept of transferability of adversarial examples.
In particular, an adversarial example generated to mislead
a model f is said to be transferable if it can mislead other
models f ′. It was further observed that if the attacker has
limited knowledge about the model under attack, she may
train a substitute model, craft adversarial samples against it,
and then devise them to fool the target model.
The authors analyzed this property only between classifi-
cation algorithms. We extend this analysis showing that even
adversarial samples crafted against clustering algorithms are
suitable and can be transferred to fool supervised models
successfully. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
Figure 4: Convergence of objective function on FashionM-
NIST. δ = 0.2, s = 0.25
work that proposes an analysis of transferability between
unsupervised and supervised algorithms. We evaluated the
Figure 5: Transferability of adversarial examples against su-
pervised classification models.
transferability properties of our noise by attacking the K-
Means++ algorithm on 2 000 testing samples taken from la-
bels FashionMNIST (Ankle boot, Shirt). In particular,
we used the crafted adversarial samples to test the robustness
of several classification models: a linear and an RBF SVM
[Burges 1998], two random forest [Breiman 2001] with 10
and 100 trees respectively, and the Carlini & Wagner (C&W)
deep net proposed in [Carlini and Wagner 2017]. The reader
can refer to the supplementary material for the training details
of these models.
We report the results in Figure 5, where the accuracy over
the poisoned samples only is reported. The results show
clear evidence on the transferability of our adversarial noise,
crafted against K-Means++, to the tested classifiers. Note
further that the C&W net is the most accurate model, per-
forming slightly better than the RBF SVM, and the latter
seems to be more sensitive to our adversarial noise.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have proposed a new black-box, derivative-
free adversarial methodology to fool clustering algorithms
and an optimization method inspired by genetic algorithms,
able to find an optimal adversarial mask efficiently. We have
conducted several experiments to test the robustness of clas-
sical single and ensemble clustering algorithms on different
datasets, showing that they are vulnerable to our crafted ad-
versarial noise. We have further compared our method with a
state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attack strategy, showing
that we outperform its results both in terms of attacker’s capa-
bility requirements and misclustering error. Finally, we have
also seen that the crafted adversarial noise can be applied suc-
cessfully to fool supervised algorithms too, introducing a new
transferability property between clustering and classification
models.
In our work, we have brought attention to many possible
topics of research, which we summarize in the following.
First of all, since our proposed method can be easily adapt-
able to more challenging problems, we plan to address the
evasion problem on supervised models. Furthermore, to better
characterize the robustness against different kinds of datasets,
we plan to analyze the relationship between the sparsity of
the data and the robustness of the clustering algorithms. Fi-
nally, as the work considers only the clustering problem, our
analysis can be extended to different unsupervised tasks, such
as unsupervised image segmentation, widespread in sensible
applications as well.
Ethical Impact
This work may be of importance to raise awareness over
the possible lack of safety in applications involving cluster-
ing algorithms to automatize tasks. Malevolent users can
potentially use our algorithm to obtain unwanted behaviors.
As noted in the introduction, particularly severe damages
can be done when applying our work to fool security or
decision-making tasks. On the contrary, the failure of our
attack strategy does not involve any particular consequence
in the attacked system.
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Experimental results
Choice of the cost function
In our optimization program, we employed the AMI both for
the cost function φ and the evaluation measure. Indeed, our
optimization being not derivative-dependent, we could adopt
the same function for the optimization and evaluation tasks.
Figure 1: Robustness analysis on FashionMNIST by chang-
ing the similarity measure φ.
We decided to analyze the impact of the clustering simi-
larity function φ, with FashionMNIST, and see if there were
significant differences among each other. In Figure 1, shows
the variation of results with φ equals to ARI, AMI and the
negated distance proposed in [Biggio et al. 2013] (referred as
“Frob”). The plot shows no substantial difference among the
choices of φ, suggesting that this hyperparameter does not
significantly impact the optimization process.
Comparison with state-of-the-art
For completeness and reproducibility of our experiments, we
report in Table 3 and 4 all the parameters used to compare
our algorithm with [Chhabra, Roy, and Mohapatra 2019].
In Table 5, we report a comparison for the K-means++
algorithm with UCI Wheat Seeds [Charytanowicz et al. 2010]
and MoCap Hand Postures [Gardner et al. 2014] dataset,
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 73.43) 150 1 0.85 0.2 0.35
OURS (δ = 146.87) 150 1 0.85 0.01 0.20
OURS (δ =∞) 150 1 0.85 0.001 0.25
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 73.43) 150 1 0.85 0.2 0.35
OURS (δ = 146.87) 150 1 0.85 0.01 0.20
OURS (δ =∞) 150 1 0.85 0.001 0.25
Table 3: Comparison parameters for Digits dataset with digits
8&9 (left) and 4&1 (right).
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 73.43) 150 1 0.80 0.015 0.10
OURS (δ = 146.87) 150 1 0.80 0.015 0.25
OURS (δ =∞) 150 1 0.80 0.005 0.25
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 73.43) 150 1 0.85 0.02 0.05
OURS (δ = 146.87) 150 1 0.85 0.01 0.10
OURS (δ =∞) 150 1 0.85 0.001 0.15
Table 4: Comparison parameters for MNIST dataset with
digits 3&2 (left) and 1&4 (right).
repeating the same experimental setting of [Chhabra, Roy,
and Mohapatra 2019].
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 7 0.42 0.30 2
OURS (δ = 0.15) 3± 0.76 0.28± 0.09 0.21± 0.06 2.0± 0.0
OURS (δ = 0.30) 3± 0.79 0.14± 0.04 0.10± 0.03 2.0± 0.0
METHOD ‖‖0 ‖‖2 ‖‖∞ #MISS-CLUST
SPILL-OVER 9 44.42 20.0 5
OURS (δ = 10) 1± 0.45 5.87± 2.38 5.63± 2.29 5.0± 0.0
OURS (δ = 20) 1± 1.36 13.66± 9.51 11.39± 6.06 5.0± 0.0
Table 5: Comparison for Seeds (top) and MoCap Hand Pos-
tures (bottom).
We obtain the same number of spill-over samples
(#Miss-Clust) with significant lower Power & Effort. Ta-
ble 6 contains the parameters used by our algorithm during
the comparison.
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 0.15) 20 1 0.85 0.01 0.10
OURS (δ = 0.30) 20 1 0.85 0.01 0.10
METHOD G λ pc pm pz
OURS (δ = 10) 50 1 0.20 0.15 0.20
OURS (δ = 20) 50 1 0.20 0.15 0.20
Table 6: Comparison parameters for Seeds (top) and MoCap
Hand Postures (bottom).
Transferability
In the transferability section, we show that wisely crafted
adversarial examples may transfer from unsupervised clus-
tering algorithms to supervised classification models. In the
following, we report the training setting of the tested classi-
fiers.
MODEL ALL CLASSES TWO CLASSES
LINEAR SVM 0.846 0.753
RBF SVM 0.882 0.8025
R. FOREST 10 0.856 0.739
R. FOREST 100 0.875 0.769
C&W NET 0.915 0.866
Table 7: Test accuracy on FashionMNIST test dataset. The
two classes are Ankle boot and Shirt
First, we used 60, 000 samples from FashionMNIST to
train the target classifiers. We used the scikit-learn [Pedregosa
et al. 2011] implementations for SVM and Random Forests.
For the Carlini & Wagner net, we followed the instructions
suggested by the authors in [Carlini and Wagner 2017]. Table
7 shows the test accuracy on the full dataset and only for
classes Ankle boot and Shirt.
Convergence properties
n general, GAs do not guarantee any convergence property
[Rudolph 1997]. However, under some more restrictive as-
sumptions, it can be shown that they converge to an optimum.
In this section, we show that our algorithm can be thought of
as an instance of the Abstract Genetic Algorithm (AGA) as
presented in [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990; Eiben, Aarts,
and Van Hee 1991]. Subsequently, we give a proof of conver-
gence. Below, we show the AGA pseudo-code:
Algorithm 2 Abstract Genetic Algorithm
1: Make initial population
2:
3: while not stopping condition do
4: Choose parents from population
5: Let the selected parents Produce children
6: Extend the population by adding the children to it
7: Select elements of the extended population to survive
for the next cycle
8: end while
9: Output the optimum of the population
In [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990; Eiben, Aarts, and
Van Hee 1991], the authors show that methods such as clas-
sical Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing can be
thought of as instances of Algorithm 2. Further, they prove
their probabilistic convergence to a (global) optimum. Fol-
lowing the same theoretical framework, we show that our
algorithm indeed satisfies all the conditions for convergence.
Before doing so, we first present the framework and adapt
our algorithm in order to comply with it.
Let S be a set of candidates and S∗ be a set of finite
lists over S, representing all the possible finite populations. A
neighborhood function is a functionN : S → S∗ that assigns
neighbors to each individual in S. A parent-list, is a list of
candidates able to generate offspring, with P ⊆ S∗ denoting
the set of all parent-list. In our algorithm, a population is
represented by a list [(0), . . . , (g)], therefore S = ET,δ,
S∗ = E∗T,δ , P = {[(i), (j)] | (i), (j) ∈ ET,δ}.
Let f : X → Y be a function belonging to F , the set of all
functions fromX to Y . Further, let (Ω,A,P) be a probability
space and g : Ω → F be random variable. We define the
randomized f to be the function f(ω, x) = g(ω)(x). Fol-
lowing this definition and [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990],
Algorithm 2 can be then detailed as follows:
Algorithm 3 Abstract Genetic Algorithm
1: Create an x ∈ S∗
2:
3: while not stopping condition do
4: draw α, β and γ
5: q = fc(α, x)
6: y =
⋃
z∈q fp(β, z)
7: x′ = x ∪ y
8: x = fs(γ, x
′)
9: end while
10: output the actual population
with fc : A × S∗ → P(P ) being the choice function,
fp : B × P → P(S) being the production function and
fs : C × S∗ → S∗ being the selection function. In our case,
we define:
• fc(α, x) = {[choice(α, x), x−1]}, ∀α ∈ A
• fp(β, [s1, s2]) =
mutation(β,crossover(β, s1, s2))), ∀β ∈ B
• fs(γ, x′) = x′ (Note that our selection is deterministic)
Where x−1 is the most recent candidate in the popula-
tion. In the above pseudo-code, we have explicitly stated
the randomization of our procedures choice, mutation,
crossover for clarity. The stochastic processes regulating
the drawings of α, β, and γ always maintain the same dis-
tributions regardless of the current generation, meaning that
the probability of generating a new population xnew from
another one xold does not change over the generations.
We now introduce and extend some definitions presented
in [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990]:
1. A neighborhood structure is connective if: ∀s ∈ S,∀t ∈
S : s 7→ t, where 7→ stands for the transitive closure of the
relation {(s, t) ∈ S × S | t ∈ N(s)}.
2. A choice function is generous if: (a) {[s, t] | s, t ∈
S} ⊆ P and (b) ∀x ∈ S∗, ∀s1, s2 ∈ x : P([s1, s2] ∈
fc(α, x)) > 0.
3. A production function is generous if: ∀s1, s2 ∈ S, ∀t ∈
N(s1) ∪N(s2) : P(t ∈ fp(β, [s1, s2])) > 0.
4. A selection function is generous if: ∀x ∈ S∗, ∀s ∈ x :
P(s ∈ fs(γ, x)) > 0.
5. A selection function is conservative if: Mx∩fs(γ, x) 6= ∅,
with Mx = {s ∈ x | ∀t ∈ x : f(s) ≤ f(t)}.
In [Eiben, Aarts, and van Hee 1990] pag. 10, the authors
further make a little technical assumption about the sets A,
B, and C, requiring them to be countable, with positive
probability for all their members. This is easily achieved
in real applications considering the finiteness of the floating
point representations.
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 0.1. Algorithm 1 almost surely reaches a global
optimum.
Proof. Given the previous considerations, the following state-
ments hold:
1. Our neighborhood structure is connective: by the defi-
nition of our mutation operator, it holds that N((i)) =
ET,δ,∀(i) ∈ ET,δ .
2. Our choice function is generous: this follows from (a) the
definition of P , and from (b) the positivity of the softmax
function in Equation 6.
3. Our production function is generous: See point 1.
4. Our selection function is generous: we allow all the candi-
dates to survive with probability 1.
5. Our selection function is conservative: see point 4.
The proof then follows from Theorem 3 in [Eiben, Aarts, and
Van Hee 1991], adjusting the generousness definitions with
our versions presented above. The globality of the optimum
comes from the fact that our algorithm performs a global
search, instead of a local one.
The same conclusions can be drawn for the speed-up
heuristic, by just replacing each instance of ET,δ , with E ′T,δ .
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